Services: a future of low productivity growth? by Ronald H. Schmidt
FRBSF WEEKLY LETTER
Number 92-07, February 14, 1992
Services: A Future of
Low Productivity Growth?
The question is so common lately, it has become
trite: "Is America turning into a nation of ham-
burger flippers?" The cause for concern is a
potentially disturbing pair of trends. First, em-
ployment in the United States increasingly has
shifted away from manufacturing toward services.
In 1963 manufacturing accounted for 30 percent
of all jobs, but in 1991 that share had fallen to
less than 17 percent.
Second, "real" productivity increases (that is, ad-
justed for inflation) have been significantly lower
in services than in manufacturing. Between 1963
and 1986, real output per worker in manufactur-
ing rose at an annual rate of 2.6 percent, while
real output per worker in the services sector rose
by only 0.2 percent. Taken together, these trends
suggest dire consequences: a sector with neglig-
ible productivity gains is rapidly becoming the
most important source of new jobs, while the
more productive manufacturing sector is losing
employment. The inference many observers draw
is that America faces stagnation, with most of its
labor force engaged in employment that exhibits
little productivity growth, and hence, provides
little increase in its standard of living.
This Letter takes a closer look at the data. After
combining the results of other researchers with
evidence from data on compensation, it appears
that the fundamental data on which these dire
predictions are made may be misleading. While
the evidence is not conclusive one way or the
other, data on compensation at least raise the
possibility that the opposite is true: that labor
productivity is growing faster in services than it
is in manufacturing.
The source of the "real" evidence
Concern about lack of productivity growth in the
service sector emerges from the data released by
the u.s. Department of Commerce's Bureau of
Economic Analysis (BEA) on nominal output, real
output (that is, adjusted for inflation), and em-
ployment for each industry. Using these data, it is
possible to compute "real" output per employee.
The difficulty facing BEA in determining changes
in real output per worker is daunting. In many
cases, outputs are not directly priced, and often
it is difficult or impossible to measure the quan-
tity of the output. This is particularly true in the
service sector. For example, bank customers re- .
ceive services from tellers and loan officers, but
they do not pay directly for those services; in-
stead they pay indirectly with interest rate spreads
and fixed service charges. Similarly, service in-
dustries producing information (such as research)
generate a product that is consumed by the pub-
iic, but the product is often not priced and there
is no way to count how many people benefit
from that information.
Adding to the complexity is the problem of qual-
ity changes. With the exception of a few agricul-
tural products, nearly all products change over
time, with most embedding improved features.
For example, a 1992 car cannot be compared
directlywith a 1972 car. We can countthe number
of cars sold and observe the prices charged, but
countingthe change in output-thestream ofben-
efits derived from the car-will not be correct
unless it is possible to standardize the car with
earlier models, to distinguish and count improve-
ments in dimensions of quality, safety, and emis-
sions as well as the number of units produced.
BEA's methodology
Because of limitations on data collection, BEA
must extrapolate from available information on
prices and production to calculate price or quan-
tity indexes for each industry. In the case of most
manufacturing industries, BEA has information
available about input costs, prices of some final
products, and output indexes. Although the prob-
lem of quality remains, and not all final product
prices are recorded, most manufacturing indus-
tries produce a physical output that is countable,
which makes the process less abstract.
BEA faces the same conceptual problems in serv-
ices that it does in manufacturing, but fewer
data typically are available for services. QuantityFABSF
wage differentials is related to observable labor
quality factors-experience and education, for
example-and other differentials are attributed
to unobservable quality differences.
Real Compensation and Output per Worker, Selected Industries
(Average Annual Percent Growth: 1963-86)
Compensation growth per worker in an industry,
therefore, should be related to the growth in the
productivity of its labor force. If workers are paid
the value of their marginal product, the growth in
compensation per worker in an industrv reflects
the growth in the average marginal product of
that industry's labor force.
The accompanying chart compares real compen-
sation growth per worker (the BEA's compensation
series deflated by the consumer price index) to
BEA's real output measure for manufacturing and
several service-producing industries. In many
cases, there are wide disparities in the relative
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Consider the comparison between services and
manufacturing. In contrast to the BEA real output
data, compensation data indicate higher gains in
services than in manufacturing. Service industry
compensation per worker rose at a 1.5 percent
annual rate, compared to 1.1 percent for manu-
facturing. In fact, manufacturing reported com-
pensation gains just slightly above the average
for all industries.
Evidence from compensation data
Several researchers have looked at the validity
of BEA's inter-industry productivity comparisons.
Denison (1989) argues that BEA's approach could
not accurately distribute output gains to indus-
tries when intermediate products (that is, prod-
ucts developed by one manufacturer and used by
another for producing final consumer products)
are involved. Moreover, Baily and Gordon (1988)
used a case study analysis and questioned BEA's
measurement of output gains attributed to each
industry, suggesting a bias toward manufacturing.
This bias also was noted by Smith (1972), who
found that the data consistently pushed measured
productivity gains toward the manufacturing sec-
tor and away from the service sector.
While this approach is perhaps the only available
strategy in some industries, the effects on pro-
ductivity measurements are predictably biased.
When real output is calculated for industries us-
ing labor quantities as an important measure of
output, then by definition the industry will show
no productivity growth. Moreover, price indexes
based on input costs ignore potential quality im-
provements-such as higher skilled labor and
better capital-and hence, may attribute quality
improvements inaccurately to price increases
rather than output increases.
indexes usually are not available-in fact, there
often is no physical "good" to count-and
prices also are not observed directly. To derive
"real output;' therefore, BEA must extrapolate
using indirect measures of input costs as proxies
for price changes. In other industries, such as
banking and recreation, measures of inputs are
used-often the number of employees-to proxy
for changes in the level of production.
Unfortunately, these criticisms typically are quali-
tative rather than quantitative, making it difficult
to reject BEA's conclusions. It is possible, how-
ever, to provide a quantitative check ofthe BEA
data byusing data on compensation growth by
industry.
One of the central conclusions of economic the-
ory is that wages are determined by the marginal
value of labor's contribution to that output. Thus,
changes in compensation should be related to
changes in labor's marginal productivity. Re-
search on inter-industrywage differentials offers
some support to this proposition. Empirical re-
search has found that a large portion of these
Other important differences are worth noting.
Banking is found in the output data to have vir-
tually no productivity growth, yet compensation
growth matches the average for all industries.
Moreover, output growth per worker in the health
care and legal industries is reported to have been
negative according to the real output series while
recording higher increases in compensation
growth than are found in any other industries.
Which measure is right?
Compensation is not a direct measure of produc-
tivity either, however. Economic theory shows
that changes in compensation over time can besplit roughly into two parts: changes in the rela-
tive output price of the final good and changes
in the marginal productivity ofthe labor used to
make the good.
If output prices rise for a particular product, that
may feed into compensation to workers in the
form of raises and bonuses. Over time, though,
the ability of labor to capture increases in output
prices is determined by labor's ability to restrict
the entry of new laborers. If higher wages are not
the result of higher marginal productivity by the
firm's labor force, those higher wages will attract
new workers and bid down those wages unless
the existing labor force can effectively restrict
entry through unions or Iicensing restrictions.
The second source of compensation increases,
linked to productivity gains, would appear where
the firm has raised the quality of its labor force
over time. Hiring larger proportions of skilled
labor would raise the relative compensation
growth of that industry.
Determining whether compensation increases
are due to productivity gains or to output price
gains, therefore, can be problematic. Neverthe-
less, one factor seems to be useful in distinguish-
ing between the two effects: labor mobility. In
some of the more heavily unionized and licensed
industries (manufacturing, transportation, legal,
and health care), compensation increases may
be less useful as a measure of productivity gains.
In other industries, however, where employment
growth has been rapid, it is likely that compen-
sation gains do reflect the market's evaluation of
the relative productivity of those workers.
Moreover, in industries where capital/labor ratios
have changed dramatically, compensation may
provide a superior measurement of changes in
labor productivity. BEA's simple measure of labor
productivity growth-output per worker-is not
adjusted for total productivity gains that are the
result of increased productivity of non-labor in-
puts. Thus, in industries that have become more
capital intensive, gains in average output per
worker may reflect increasing productivity of
otherfactors, not just labor. Compensation, which
is a payment to labor for its contribution to total
productivity gains, provides the market's assess-
ment of the value produced by those workers.
For many industries, therefore, differences
between the compensation growth rates and
measured real productivity gains may signal
measurement errors. Particularly in the case of
service industries, where output and prices are
nearly impossible to observe directly, compensa-
tion may offer an alternative measure of produc-
tivity gains. While it is clear that compensation
growth is not a perfect measure of productivity
growth, trends in compensation raise an impor-
tant question: If productivity growth is so low in
some sectors, why are employers willing to pay
the workers so much? If market participants are
relatively rational, the payment workers receive
may be a better indicator of the market's evalua-
tion of their productivity than is the traditional
BEA measure.
Conclusions
Concern about the observed shift of employment
toward service industries often is based on the
assumption that services have lower productivity
growth than manufacturing. The BEA real output
data are used to support this proposition. As
shown in this Letter, however, data on real com-
pensation per worker provide conflicting evi-
dence, at least suggesting the possibility that
services have had faster productivity increases
than manufacturing.
The compensation data are not a perfect measure
of productivity growth either, but the fact that the
data differ so dramatically from the output data
is disturbing. At a minimum, the compensation
data, along with results from other researchers
looking at particular industries, suggest that the
inter-industry productivity comparisons made
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